Fire service adopts high‑risk “dope on the ropes” strategy

The late Mohammad Ali had a strategy for dealing with his more challenging opponents. His approach to key boxing matches – which he named his “dope on a rope” – consisted of allowing his opposition to hit seven bells out of him while he used the ropes to take up much of the energy of the punches that hit him. Most famously, he used this technique in his 1974 fight in Kinshasa, Zaire, now known as the “rumble in the jungle”.

As a strategy, it is high risk with a potential for devastating damage and loss. In many respects, the UK’s fire and rescue services have behaved similarly, although there has not been a conclusive knockout so far, rather a slow degradation brought about by the sector rolling with the punches.

Since the turn of the century, the service has been hit time and again with sometimes the stings of ‘butterflies’ and sometimes with real ‘haymakers’. But enough of the boxing metaphors. The punches taken by the fire and rescue services since the 2000s have reduced their ability to deliver the service that staff and the public expect.

When it comes to fixing the service, which many appear now to accept that if not broken, then critically in need of urgent life support, the do-more-with-less culture is making a much-heralded return. The proposals for devolution of local government and the latest transfer of the FRS from the Home Office back to the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government emphasises the familiar “ping pong” approach everyone is familier with (Home Office;2001–2002: Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR) 2002–2006: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) 2006–2016: Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) 2016–2025: Home Office).

The government’s white policy paper on English Devolution[1] lays out the strategy for delivering structural changes in the governance of England to deliver efficiencies that promote economic growth. The white paper primarily aims to decentralise power from Whitehall to local authorities to stimulate the economy and improve public services. The paper also outlines a plan to reorganise local government from two tiers into unitary authorities. We can expect these new unitary bodies to manage a population of at least 500,000. Before devolution can be achieved, it will likely need to be predicated on the merging of two or more unitary authorities to provide a combined authority that will be controlled by mayors rather than councils or unitary authorities. This format already exists in metropolitan areas, including Greater Manchester and the West Midlands. But the population of 500,000 is likely to be challenging. Most unitaries, including London boroughs and others, have populations much smaller than 500,000. Some are as low as 265,000, and the average in the metropolitan area is only around 340,000. Only 12 single-tier councils have populations of more than 500,000, with Birmingham the largest at 1.2 million and Leeds with 850,000. There are 21 two-tier counties and all have populations greater than the 500,000. So the plan is to create a series of large single-strategic authorities (SA), whether led by a “foundation SA” (where there are non-mayoral combined authorities, combined county authorities and any strategic authority without a mayor), or mayoral SA (Greater London Authority, all mayoral combined authorities and all mayoral Combined County Authorities). Additional funding will be made available to mayoral SAs that meet certain criteria.

The government aims to provide ‘efficient, accountable, and visible leadership, with a determination from the outset to bring together the roles that operate at a sub-regional level’. Among these roles are the police and, more pertinently, the FRS. This is where things have the potential to get complicated. If mayoral geography aligns with the police force and FRS, mayors will be, by default, responsible for exercising both Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) and Fire and Rescue Authority (FRA) functions.

 

“The punches taken by the fire and rescue services since the 2000s have reduced their ability to deliver the service that staff and the public expect”

 

The government’s aim is to increase the number of mayors who take on PCC responsibilities and police and FRS boundaries will therefore be a key consideration in the negotiation (remember this bit – it is a negotiated agreement and not a dictat on local authorities by government – at least in theory!) of new strategic authorities. If authorities are not aligned correctly – for the strategic structure or eventual devolution purposes – then the government will take steps to ensure alignment over the longer term. The government is also looking to identify if a single mayor can be responsible for the PCC and FRA across two or more police forces or FRSs. An interesting challenge may pop up in Devon, Somerset and Avon; for example, the police service has Devon and “Avon and Somerset” police services; the FRS has both “Devon and Somerset” and Avon FRSs. Untangle that one! It is not clear from the white paper that the government would make the necessary legal changes to facilitate the necessary realignments in these odd cases, although it does state it will alter boundaries in the interest of public safety through the English Devolution Bill and consider the functions of the PCC and FRA being transferred to the mayor ‘on a case-by-case basis to ensure the continued efficiency and effectiveness of policing and fire functions’. They would seek to “strengthen the accountability of mayors and enable them to forge stronger links and partnerships for the good of all the people that live in their Strategic Authority area”.

So we have the plan, and a growing opposition in the form of some incumbents of local democracy and their representatives. And, of course, all plans change on first contact with the “enemy”. Nevertheless, seismic changes have taken place in the English local governance structures before, and in particular, for the FRS, it seems an evolutionary process. Local Government changes in 1947, 1974, 1996, the Scotland Act 1998, the Northern Ireland Act 1998, and the Government of Wales Act 1998, and the Fire and Rescue Services Act (FRSA) 2004 have all led to changes, minor and large, in structure and organisation, some successful and some less so. Of course, proposals to change the way local government is organised and managed are nothing new, although the intervals between major changes are shrinking, with suggestions for tweaking structure and finance appearing to pop up every few years, most often being consigned to the dustbin. The FRS has a long legacy of changes. Taking the long view, this current proposed restructure of local government and, consequently, changes to the FRS is not just another tweaking but for those considering the possibilities for future structures, a look back in time may give rise to ideas on how the future FRS should have looked in previous reviews.

Before the Second World War there were more than 1,500 fire services in the UK. Full-time professionals in many cities and larger towns, part-time or volunteers (supported sometimes by a few paid professionals) in the smaller towns and villages. The governance arrangements ran from the London County Council through to parish councils with populations in the low thousands. A nationalised response to the threat of bombing in the Second World War led to the creation of the National Fire Service (NFS) in 1941 through the amalgamation of the Auxiliary Fire Service and local authority fire brigades. In 1948, under the provisions of the Fire Services Act 1947, the NFS was disbanded, and about 150 fire brigades were created across the UK based on county councils, county boroughs, city boroughs and city brigades.

 

“Seismic changes have taken place in the English local governance structures before, and in particular, for the FRS, it seems an evolutionary process”

 

In 1967 the Departmental Committee on the Fire Service was appointed. This committee, chaired by Sir Ronald Holroyd, the then Deputy Chairman of ICI, was asked to carry out a detailed investigation into the work, organisation and future development of the fire service. The first of its terms of reference was to look into ‘the principles which should govern the organisation of the fire service’. The committee published its report, known as the Holroyd Report, in May 1970. At that time, there were 132 brigades in England and Wales, these were based on cities, adjacent boroughs and counties, and few had more than ten stations. One of the main conclusions was that there was ‘a compelling case for larger and more uniform fire authorities’ and that the optimum size of a brigade would be one containing 1,100-1,300 staff and around 30 stations, with one full-time station equivalent to two part-time stations. The Holroyd Report made many influential recommendations that shaped the Fire Service in the UK at that time. Local government re-organisation in 1974 took on board Holroyd’s case for larger fire authorities, and responsibility for maintaining brigades was passed to county and metropolitan authorities. This reduced the number of fire brigades to 64 in the UK. Over the decades, there have been further tweaks: subsequent re-organisations of local government in 1985 and 1996 have continued the trend towards larger fire authorities, even when the constituent local authorities making up fire authorities have been getting smaller. The metropolitans were changed in 1986, and there has been replacement of district and county councils in some areas by unitary authorities in the 1990s, and there are now just 14 county council-led services. Even in 1998, the size of brigades varied considerably; for example, the number of employees ranged from 262 in the Isle of Wight to around 7,155 in London. The service employed 56,000 people altogether, of whom around 60 per cent were whole-time firefighters, 27 per cent were retained firefighters, three per cent worked in control rooms, and the remaining ten per cent were non-uniformed support staff.

The smaller unitary authorities that came out of local government re-organisation by the mid-1990s have not been designated as fire authorities, but they have been required to form part of combined fire authorities, CFAs. This led to several significantly different political bodies responsible for securing the services of a fire brigade. In 1998, there were seven types of fire authorities, each with a different legal constitution, financial system, funding mechanism and support service provision, all of which impact on the service provided. They were London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority Metropolitan Fire and Civil Defence Authorities (six), Combined Fire Authorities (24), County Councils (15), Fire Authority for Northern Ireland, Welsh Combined Fire Authorities (three) and regional Scottish Fire Boards (eight). The services operated from 1,588 fire stations with 36,000 whole time and 23,000 on-call firefighters.

Today, there are 49 FRSs in the UK: 44 in England, three in Wales, one in Scotland and one in Northern Ireland, with 1,393 fire stations and 20 per cent fewer firefighters. The eventual number of services is likely to change as many services could be combined relatively easily subject to government resilience in the face of localist agendas, as has been the case in the past when mergers (or acquisitions) have been suggested. The mergers in Scotland, Wales and the three English combinations, while not painless, have been achieved.

It is interesting as the devolved nations approach this has contradicted the Holroyd principle that the FRS should remain under local control: ‘It is an accepted part of the national pattern of public activity that responsibility for the provision and local administration of many important services should rest with local authorities. Unless, therefore, any valid reasons can be shown for an exception for a particular service, its administration should fall within the national pattern of local government’. What defines “local” for the FRS is now a moot point as what is “local” when a fire service covers a diverse geographical and social area, with many large inhabited and/or remote islands (Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales). If this can be achieved, then it is only a small practical step (but a huge psychological one for the FRS and their political leadership) to consider a strategic change to the UK FRS structure that produces a national FRS – one per nation. Instead of asking why? Ask Why not?

 

“Even in 1998, the size of brigades varied considerably; for example, the number of employees ranged from 262 in the Isle of Wight to around 7,155 in London”

 

The potential difficulties arise when the optimum structures envisaged in Holroyd (1,100-1,300 staff and 30 stations) collide with the inertia of the current oddball mixture of geographical and political structures. If one were to be asked to design an FRS for the UK, it would not look like the current model. Holroyd examined the principles which should govern the organisation of the Fire Service, and its first point under consideration was the question of nationalisation of the Fire Service. During the Second World War, the NFS proved to be an effective organisation in the face of incendiary attacks. Moreover, the increased national interest in protection from fire that the war brought was a unified national chain of command that could divide the country into areas of predominating risk and communications to provide a viable fire service to cover each area. According to Holroyd, appointments, promotions, and training would be standardised, economies of scale would procure a better deal when purchasing appliances, uniforms and equipment, and the centralisation of resources would provide a simplified data collation and research capability. Ironically, the Blair government and subsequent administrations have taken a contrarian view, dismantling key parts of the infrastructure needed by any effective organisation which serves a country. There is no systematic approach to training, promotions and appointments; no effective administration of data; no coordinated fire research to benefit the service and the nation (think of the way most domestic fires are fought in the country!); no standardised attendance requirements; or, common performance standards. And now, a national safety service gets bounced from one controlling government to another without consideration of the disruptions and destabilising impact this can have.

 

“If one were to be asked to design an FRS for the UK, it would not look like the current model”

 

The “dope on the rope” strategy may be working: the service takes the blows and waits to see the sunlit uplands. But when every proposed change is accepted in the hope of wearing the adversaries of the FRS so that one day soon they will see it as no longer worth the bother, national leaders may think that changing the FRS will be a walkover as in the past. Is it a high-risk strategy? Who at the national political level is standing up for the FRS? A national (England-wide) service could be the answer – one department, one leader and one voice for the Fire and Rescue Service. How many ministers have there been with responsibility for fire this century? More than 20, with the last few incumbents responsible for crime, policing and fire having a much lower profile despite the fallout of Grenfell. The loss of more than one-third of the workforce has shown how the needs of the service have been ignored by governments, and reductions in service provision have been allowed to pass with hardly a whimper. The health service, the police and others all raise their collective voices to increase investment and funding, and by and large succeed in protecting their industry, while the FRS is allowed to wither on the vine with no one successfully fighting for the whole sector, and not just the individual service’s cause. The “dope on a rope” strategy worked for Mohammed Ali, but how confident is the service that its adoption will succeed for the FRS? Or will the proposed changes mean the writing is on the wall for the FRS to be subsumed into a melting pot where it becomes a smaller fish in a bigger sea?

 

Tony.prosser@artemistdl.co.uk

 

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^[1]    https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/english-devolution-white-paper-power-and-partnership-foundations-for-growth/english-devolution-white-paper#executive-summary